\u3cem\u3eHardwick v. Bowers\u3c/em\u3e: An Attempt to Pull the Meaning of \u3cem\u3eDoe v. Commonwealth\u27s Attorney\u3c/em\u3e Out of the Closet by Fuller, Elisa L.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 39 Number 5 Article 8 
9-1-1985 
Hardwick v. Bowers: An Attempt to Pull the Meaning of Doe v. 
Commonwealth's Attorney Out of the Closet 
Elisa L. Fuller 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Elisa L. Fuller, Hardwick v. Bowers: An Attempt to Pull the Meaning of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney 
Out of the Closet, 39 U. Miami L. Rev. 973 (1985) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol39/iss5/8 
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
Hardwick v. Bowers: An Attempt to Pull the
Meaning of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney
Out of the Closet
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................... 973
II. THE PRECEDENTIAL VALUE OF SUMMARY AFFIRMANCES ....................... 977
III. ANALYSIS OF Hardwick v. Bowers ......................................... 983
A. Applicability of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney ..: ................. 983
B. Doctrinal Developments Since Doe .................................. 988
IV . C OM M ENTS ............................................................. 992
A. Further Uncertainty Regarding Doe ................................. 992
B. The Supreme Court's Resolution? ................................... 994
I. INTRODUCTION
Two years after a succession of cases addressing the constitu-
tional right to privacy culminated in the Supreme Court's decision
in Roe v. Wade,' a group of male homosexuals challenged the con-
stitutionality of a Virginia statute criminalizing sodomy.' A three
judge district court declared the statute constitutional and denied
the plaintiffs' prayer for an injunction against the enforcement of
the statute.' On appeal to the Supreme Court,4 the Court affirmed
the lower court's decision with a one line statement, "Affirmed on
appeal from D.C.E.D. Va." 5 Legal scholars harshly criticized the
Court's action because the decision came in the midst of great
speculation as to the extent to which the Constitution barred state
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (criminal abortion statutes violated the constitutional right to
privacy). Prior right to privacy cases included Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (state
may not bar access of unmarried persons to contraceptives); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969) (right to privacy in conjunction with the first amendment prevents state regulation of
pornography when viewed in private at home); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(statute that forbade the use of contraceptives by married couples unconstitutional).
2. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975). See infra note
54 for text of the statute.
3. The court initially declared the statute, which prohibited all sodomy, whether be-
tween married or unmarried persons, constitutional on its face. The majority went on, how-
ever, to distinguish earlier privacy cases as premised on the sanctity of marriage. 403 F.
Supp. at 1200. It is unclear, therefore, whether the court really held the statute unconstitu-
tional on its face, or just as applied to homosexuals.
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1982) (provides for direct appeal to the Supreme Court from a
three judge district court order denying a permanent injunction).
5. 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
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regulation of private sexual behavior between consenting adults.'
Nine years later, both state and federal courts are still struggling
to interpret the meaning of the Court's ruling in that case.7
Appellant, Michael Hardwick, was a homosexual who regularly
engaged in acts proscribed by the Georgia sodomy statutes and al-
leged that he would continue to do so in the future. On August 3,
1982, Atlanta police arrested and charged Hardwick with commit-
ting sodomy in his home with another consenting male adult. After
a hearing, Hardwick was bound over to the Superior Court. The
District Attorney, however, decided not to present the case to the
grand jury unless further evidence developed.
Subsequently, Hardwick filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia requesting the
6. See, e.g., P. BATOR, D. SHAPIRO, P. MISHKIN, & H. WESCHLER, HART & WESCHLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURT & THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 159 n.1 (Supp. 1981); Comment, The Consti-
tutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 553 n.4 (1976); Recent Decisions, 15
Duq. L. REV. 123 (1976). But see Comment, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney: Closing the
Door to a Fundamental Right of Sexual Privacy, 53 DEN. L.J. 553, 555 (1976).
7. The following cases cited Doe as precedent for the constitutionality of statutes regu-
lating sodomy: Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289, 292
(5th Cir. 1985) (declared a sodomy statute as applied to homosexuals constitutional);
Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1391-92 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 746 F.2d 1579
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (relying on Doe to uphold the discharge of a Navy officer for engaging in
homosexual conduct); State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 360, 366 (Iowa 1976) (dissenting
opinion) (citing Doe as precedent to uphold a sodomy statute as applied to unmarried
heterosexuals).
For a series of cases that distinguished Doe and addressed the right to privacy issue, see
Dronenburg, 746 F.2d at 1580-81 (dissenting opinion) (would grant rehearing to determine if
the constitutional right to privacy encompasses homosexuality); Baker, 553 F. Supp. at
1136-38 (declared sodomy statute unconstitutional on right to privacy and equal protection
grounds); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 493, 415 N.E.2d 936, 943, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 953
(1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981) (distinguished Doe as based on plaintiffs' lack of
standing).
The following cases cited Doe as evidence of the Court's intent to restrict the right of
privacy to heterosexual conduct: Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 1976) (Doe
necessarily confined the constitutionally protected right to privacy to heterosexual conduct,
probably only within the marital relationship); Johnson v. San Jacinto Junior College, 498
F. Supp. 555, 575 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (Doe is evidence of the Supreme Court's intent to restrict
protection of sexual intimacy to marital relationships).
For a discussion, in dicta, of the unsettled question of whether the Constitution pro-
tects private consensual homosexual activity, see Rich v. Secretary of the Army, where the
government's interest in regulating the armed forces outweighed homosexuals' privacy inter-
ests, 735 F.2d 1220, 1228 n.8 (10th Cir. 1984) and, under the same circumstances, Beller v.
Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 809-10 (9th Cir. 1980).
See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 941-43 (1978) ("Although the force of
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney is to a degree augmented by previous dicta, it is difficult
to belief [sic] that it can survive indefinitely.").
8. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984). See infra note 54 for text of the statute.
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court to declare the Georgia sodomy statute unconstitutional.9
John and Mary Doe, a married couple, joined in the suit claiming
that they desired to engage in sexual activity which was prohibited
by the statute, but felt "chilled and deterred" due to the existence
of the statute and Hardwick's recent arrest.10 The Does had never
been arrested nor threatened with arrest for violating the statute.
Upon motion by the defendants,1 the district court dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.'2 The court ruled that only Hardwick had standing to
bring suit,' 3 but that the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney14 foreclosed his constitutional
challenge to the statute.
The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, which first agreed that only Hardwick
had standing to bring suit.' 5 As to his privacy claim, however, the
court reversed and remanded,' holding that Doe was not disposi-
tive of the constitutional issues in this case because the Supreme
Court could have based its summary affirmance on Doe's lack of
standing.' Alternatively, the court held that subsequent doctrinal
developments after the decision in Doe had robbed it of any prece-
dential value.' 8 The court determined that the statute criminaliz-
ing sodomy contravened a fundamental right-to engage in private,
consensual sexual activity which both the ninth amendment and
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution protected. 9 In order to prevail, the state, on
remand, must prove both a compelling interest to regulate such
behavior and that the statute was narrowly drawn to serve that
interest.20 Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir.), reh'g de-
9. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1204 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 765 F.2d 1123
(11th Cir. 1985).
10. Id.
11. The complaint named as defendants the Attorney General of Georgia, the District
Attorney for Fulton County, and the Public Safety Commissioner of Atlanta. Id. at 1204.
12. Hardwick v. Bowers, No. C83-273A, slip op. (N.D. Ga. Apr. 18, 1983) (included in
Petition for Ceritorari at Appendix A).
13. Id.
14. 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
15. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1204-07.
16. Id. at 1213.
17. Id. at 1207-08.
18. Id. at 1208-10.
19. Id. at 1212-13.
20. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-56 (state regulations of fundamental rights, such as marriage
and family relationships, must be narrowly drawn to only reach a compelling state interest).
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nied, 765 F.2d 1123 (11th Cir. 1985).
This note will discuss the precedential value of the Supreme
Court's summary affirmance in Doe. This question is particularly
significant in light of the Court's decisions regulating the preceden-
tial effect of summary affirmances, and the uncertainty surround-
ing the constitutional right to privacy at the time the Court de-
cided Doe. This note takes the position that Doe is not binding on
lower courts because the basis of the summary affirmance is un-
clear. At least some of the Justices may have voted to summarily
affirm Doe based on plaintiffs' lack of standing because plaintiffs
had never been arrested nor threatened with arrest for violating
the sodomy statute. In addition, subsequent decisions have hinted
that the question of the constitutionality of sodomy statutes is still
open. Those decisions support the premise that the Court may
have decided Doe on the standing issue. Finally, this note will sug-
gest that the Supreme Court promulgate a rule governing summary
affirmances that will eliminate the precedential value of such deci-
sions. Such a rule will eliminate the difficult task lower courts now
face when trying to interpret the meaning of summary affirmances.
Since the right to privacy is amply addressed elsewhere, this note
will not address that issue except where it relates to the Court's
summary affirmance of Doe.21 In addition, this note will not dis-
cuss either the Does' or Hardwick's standing to bring suit.22
21. Upon first hearing the facts of Hardwick, the constitutional right to privacy would
seem to be the paramount issue in the case. In fact, the Supreme Court of the United States
will soon address the issue of whether the constitutional right to privacy protects private
sexual acts between consenting adults because the Court granted certiorari in Hardwick.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1985, at 11, col. 1-3 (nat'l ed.). An analysis of the Eleventh Circuit's
decision, however, must first be directed at the precedential value of Doe, however, because
several courts have treated the Supreme Court's summary aflirmance of that case as a bar to
any further discussion of the constitutionality of sodomy statutes. See supra note 7. It was
only after the court determined that Doe was not controlling, that it was able to reach the
right to privacy issue. For a discussion of the constitutional right to privacy arguments re-
garding homosexuality, see Note, Hardwick v. Bowers Revisited: Is AIDS a Compelling
State Interest?, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. - (1985). See also Hafen, The Constitutional Status
of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual & Social Interests, 81
MIcH. L. REV. 463 (1983); Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual Preference Law, 30
DRAKE L. REV. 311 (1980-81); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Ho-
mosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1285 (1985); Note, The Constitu-
tionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1613 (1974);
Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 670
(1973). Even though the Supreme Court apparently plans to clarify the uncertainty of Doe,
a discussion of the Court's summary practice is appropriate because the Court continues to
use summary disposals to manage its docket. See infra note 26.
22. For relevant discussions of standing, see City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95
(1983); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); C. WRIGHT,
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II. THE PRECEDENTIAL VALUE OF SUMMARY AFFIRMANCES
Congress regulates the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
through guidelines established by Article III of the Constitution."
The statutes regulating the Court's appellate jurisdiction differen-
tiate between discretionary jurisdiction by writ of certiorari and
obligatory jurisdiction by appeal.24 While the Court has full discre-
tion to decide whether to grant a petition for certiorari, Congress
has mandated that the Court must decide cases arising on appeal
on the merits.25 Although the Justices must decide the merits, they
may summarily dispose of the case without considering briefs,
hearing oral argument or writing a full opinion. 6
THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 70-74 (4th ed. 1983).
23. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
See also R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 34-36 (5th ed. 1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as STERN & GRESSMAN1.
24. Congress has provided for appeal to the Supreme Court from (1) an interlocutory or
final judgment of a federal court holding a congressional act unconstitutional in any civil
action where the United States is a party, 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982); (2) an order granting or
denying an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action required to be heard by
a three judge district court, 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1982); (3) a decision of any circuit court of
appeals holding a state statute repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States, 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (1982); (4) a final judgment rendered by the highest court of a
state or Puerto Rico declaring a federal law invalid, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257(1) & 1258(1) (1982);
and (5) a final judgment rendered by the highest court of a state or Puerto Rico upholding
the validity of a state statute against a challenge on the ground of its repugnancy to the
Constitution or federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) & 1258(2) (1982). See also STERN & GRESS-
MAN, supra note 23, at 52-247 (detailed discussion of the Court's appellate jurisdiction).
25. See Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 585 n.4 (1943) (purpose of the Judiciary Act of
1925 was to limit, in certain types of cases, the Court's obligatory jurisdiction by replacing
appeals as of right with discretionary review by certiorari). See also 12 J. MOORE, H. BENDIX
& B. RINGLE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE V 400.05-1 (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as
MOORE'S]; Note, Summary Disposition of Supreme Court Appeals: The Significance of
Limited Discretion and a Theory of Limited Precedent, 52 B.U.L. REv. 373, 375 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Summary Disposition] (in-depth analysis of the Court's sum-
mary practice, but note subsequent decisions, infra notes 29, 31, 35 & accompanying text).
26. In order to manage its large case load, the Court has summarily disposed of some
appeals. Rosenberg, Notes from the Underground: A Substantive Analysis of Summary Ad-
judication by the Burger Court: Part I, 19 Hous. L. REv. 607, 619-20, 631 n.107 (1982)
(quoting letter from the Justices to Sen. DeConcini) [hereinafter cited as Rosenberg, Part
I]. Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine the percentage of cases arising on appeal of
which the Court has summarily disposed. This is the case because the Office of the Clerk of
the Supreme Court does not maintain separate statistics regarding cases arising on appeal,
as compared to cases arising upon a writ of certiorari. Telephone interview with Office of the
Clerk, Supreme Court of the United States, Public Information Desk. See also U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.: 1985 178 (105th ed. 1984) (disposition of
cases filed for the Terms 1970-1983). A study prepared in 1972, however, determined that
the Court summarily disposed of 209 of 253 appeals in the 1971 Term. Report of the Study
Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, 57 F.R.D. 573, 622 (1972).
Because not all cases arising on appeal are of great import, Supreme Court Rule 15
1985]
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Because the Court has obligatory jurisdiction over appeals, or-
ders summarily affirming or dismissing for want of a substantial
federal question are decisions on the merits and binding on lower
courts.2 Once the Court issues a summary affirmance or dismissal,
the lower courts are faced with the task of determining exactly
what the Supreme Court decided, without the aid of a written
opinion.2 In several opinions handed down in the 1970's, the Court
sought to provide lower courts with guidelines to interpret the
meaning of summary affirmances and dismissals. In Fusari v.
Steinberg,9 the Court admonished judges against making broad
interpretations of summary affirmances if it served to nullify a pre-
vious full opinion.80 In a later case, Hicks v. Miranda,s l the major-
ity stated that summary affirmances or dismissals are only binding
requires the appellant to file a jurisdictional statement setting forth reasons why the issues
are so substantial as to require plenary consideration. SuP. CT. R. 15.1(h). The appellee may
file a motion to dismiss or affirm in response. Sup. CT. R. 16.1. Similar to the Court's certio-
rari practice, the Court will receive briefs and hear oral argument if four or more justices
believe the issues warrant such review. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246, 247 (1959)
(memorandum of Brennan, J.). Otherwise, the Court will summarily affirm or dismiss the
case for want of a substantial federal question without an opinion. Id. See also Note, Sum-
mary Disposition, supra note 25, at 394-400 (discussion of Court's appellate practices and
procedures).
27. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975). Traditionally, the Court summarily disposes
of appeals from federal courts by affirmance and appeals from state courts by dismissal for
want of a substantial federal question. For classes of cases arising on appeal, see supra
note 24. Although literally the two actions would seem to be different, the impact is the
same. Either action is binding on lower courts and the Court discusses their precedential
value interchangeably. Hicks, 422 U.S. at 344; MoosE's, supra note 25, at 4-21; Note, The
Precedential Effect of Summary Affirmances and Dismissals for Want of a Substantial
Federal Question by the Supreme Court after Hicks v. Miranda and Mandel v. Bradley, 64
VA. L. REV. 117, 117 n.7 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Precedential Effect).
The distinction in terminology apparently arose because the Court wished to avoid ad-
dressing the issue of federal jurisdiction when summarily disposing of appeals from state
courts. Note, Summary Disposition, supra note 25, at 414. In other words, the Court will
dismiss an appeal from a state court if it lacks jurisdiction because the federal question
presented was insubstantial, or if the federal question met the jurisdictional threshold, but
does not warrant plenary consideration. See also Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v.
Rizzo, 428 U.S. 913 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). A summary
affirmance necessarily assumes that the lower court had jurisdiction. Id. at 921-22. A dismis-
sal for want of a substantial federal question, however, may mean that the federal question
was insubstantial or that the state court correctly decided a substantial federal question. Id.
28. See also P. BATOR, D. SHAPIRO, P. MISHKIN, & H. WESCHLER, HART & WESCHLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 11 (Supp. 1981). Even full opinions are
often very difficult to interpret due to the frequency of concurring and dissenting opinions
that join only portions of the majority opinion. Id. at 11 n.2.
29. 419 U.S. 379 (1974).
30. Id. at 388 n.15.
31. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
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precedent in cases presenting sufficiently similar issues."2 In addi-
tion, the Court commented that subsequent doctrinal develop-
ments may undermine the precedential value of a summary affirm-
ance or dismissal."3 Hicks, however, did not elaborate on the
procedure courts should use to determine exactly what issues the
Supreme Court in fact decided.
3 4
Two years later, the Court sought to clarify Hicks in Mandel
v. Bradley35 when it declared that a previous summary affirmance
was not dispositive of the issue presented in Mandel.36 The per
curiam opinion quoted Chief Justice Burger's concurrence in
Fusari,3 7 stating that a summary affirmance affirms only the judg-
ment, not the rationale of the lower court.38 In addition, the Court
stated:
Summary affirmances and dismissals for want of a substantial
federal question without doubt reject the specific challenges
presented in the statement of jurisdiction and do leave undis-
turbed the judgment appealed from. They do prevent lower
courts from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues
presented and necessarily decided by those actions .... Sum-
mary actions, however,.., should not be understood as breaking
new ground but as applying principles established by prior deci-
sions to the particular facts involved .... The precedential sig-
nificance of the summary action ... is to be assessed in the light
of all of the facts in that case .... s
Mandel essentially created a two-step test for lower courts to
apply in determining the precedential weight of summary dispos-
als. First, the lower court must establish exactly what issues were
32. Id. at 345. The Court recognized the difficulty in determining the issues and stated:
"Ascertaining the reach and content of summary actions may itself present issues of real
substance .... Id.
33. Id. at 344.
34. Both individual Justices and legal scholars criticized Hicks. Colorado Springs
Amusements, Ltd., 428 U.S. at 917 ("Hicks will impair the Court's ability to... adjudicate
important constitutional issues."); Tushnet, The Mandatory Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court-Some Recent Developments, 46 U. CIN. L. Rav. 347, 365 (1977) (Court's declarations
have only created "troublesome anomalies").
35. 432 U.S. 173 (1977) (per curiam).
36. Id. at 176.
37. 419 U.S. at 391-92.
38. 432 U.S. at 176.
39. Id. (emphasis added). Cf. Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S.
173 (1979). The Court considered a summary affirmance to be of less precedential value
than a full opinion for purposes of stare decisis. Id. at 180-81. The opinion may be taken for
the proposition that the Court is more likely to reconsider issues disposed of summarily
rather than by plenary review.
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presented in light of all the facts in the prior case. Second, the
lower court must determine if the Supreme Court necessarily de-
cided those issues when it summarily disposed of the case.'0
Justice Brennan elaborated on this test in his concurring opin-
ion where he commented that courts should make a detailed analy-
sis of summary dispositions before relying on them as precedent."
1
He stated that state and federal judges must first examine the ju-
risdictional statement in the earlier case to determine if the consti-
tutional issues are the same.' If the issues are the same, the judge
must then determine if the Court's decision actually rested upon
those issues and "not even arguably upon some alternative noncon-
stitutional ground. The judgment should not be interpreted as de-
ciding the constitutional questions unless no other construction of
the disposition is plausible."'
3
Despite the Court's attempts to clarify the precedential value
of summary aflirmances and dismissals, lower courts still struggle
to interpret and apply them." The Court has aggravated the prob-
40. Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176. There is a tension between the Court's initial statement
that summary disposals "without doubt reject the specific challenges presented in the state-
ment of jurisdiction.. ." and its later statements that summary actions prevent lower courts
from reaching "opposite conclusions on the precise issues presented and necessarily decided.
•. ." and that summary disposals should "be assessed in the light of all of the facts in that
case; .... ." Id. (emphasis added). The two-step test set out above is a logical resolution of
the conflict because confining the precedential value of a summary action to the issues
raised in the jurisdictional statement may preclude consideration of different issues which
the respondent may raise. For example, a plaintiff who lost on the merits in a lower court
would not raise the issue of standing on appeal. See Illinois Elections Bd., 440 U.S. at 182-
83 ("A summary disposition affirms only the judgment of the court below .... and no more
may be read into our action than was essential to sustain that judgment."). This interpreta-
tion is further supported by the concept that the whole case comes up on appeal and the
Court may consider all issues raised in the case below. See infra note 73 and accompanying
text.
41. Mandel, 432 U.S. at 179-80.
42. Id. at 180.
43. Id. at 180 (Brennan, J., concurring) (none of the other Justices dissented from this
view). Justice Brennan's concurrence supports the analysis in supra note 40 and accompa-
nying text.
44. For an example of complete confusion, see Rosenberg, Part I, supra note 26, at 632
n.112 (analyzing Jones v. T.H., 425 U.S. 986 (1976), af'g 425 F. Supp. 873 (D. Utah 1975)).
Stern & Gressman suggest using anything in the earlier record, appeal papers, and even the
parties' briefs to interpret summary aflirmances. STERN & GRESSMAN, supra note 23, at 333-
34. See also Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 617 n.5 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing) (implies that use of the parties' briefs is appropriate when interpreting summary aflir-
mances); Comment, The Precedential Weight of a Dismissal by the Supreme Court for
Want of a Substantial Federal Question: Some Implications of Hicks v. Miranda, 76
COLuM. L. REv. 508, 532 n.154 (1976) (suggests using the jurisdictional statement, the appel-
lee's reply, and the lower court's opinion). But see supra text at note 38.
It is understandable that lower courts have difficulty interpreting summary affirmances,
[Vol. 39:973
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lem by summarily disposing of complex and novel constitutional
issues despite its instruction to lower courts that summary actions
should not be viewed "as breaking new ground but as applying
principles established by prior decisions.""' Rather than restricting
the use of summary affirmances and dismissals to "frivolous" ap-
peals, 6 it appears that the Court has occasionally used summary
actions as another means of avoiding controversial questions. 7 A
summary affirmance or dismissal for want of a substantial federal
question may, therefore, create a binding ruling on an important
constitutional question without providing any explanation of the
Court's rationale.
Although the Court's summary calendar provides an efficient
method of controlling the appellate docket, the benefits of the
practice break down when the Court summarily disposes of cases
which present novel constitutional questions.4" Summary affir-
mances or dismissals in such cases limit and may even foreclose
further discussions of important constitutional issues by lower
courts because the Supreme Court has declared that its summary
because the Supreme Court Justices themselves still disagree as to the proper interpretation
of certain summary dispositions. Compare Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
462 U.S. 416, 433 n.18 (1983) (prior summary affirmance is not binding because it may have
rested on alternative grounds) with id. at 455 n.3 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (Justice
O'Connor refers to the district court's opinion in order to interpret a prior summary
aflfirmance).
45. Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176. See also Levin & Hellman, The Many Roles of the Su-
preme Court and the Constraints of Time and Caseload, 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 399, 410 (1976)
(the Court has summarily disposed of appeals "involving issues that were novel, difficult,
and highly controversial").
46. Note, Impact of the Supreme Court's Summary Disposition Practice on Its Ap-
peals Jurisdiction, 27 RuTrGas L. REv. 952, 962 (1974). A five year study of summary ac-
tions showed that most were disposals of frivolous appeals or obvious extensions of prior
decisions. Rosenberg, Part I, supra note 26, at 621.
47. Comment, Per Curiam Decisions of the Supreme Court: 1957 Term, 26 U. CH. L.
REV. 279, 282 (1959); Marshall, Supreme Court Summary Dispositions: Either Change the
Rules or Stop Giving Short Shrift to Important Issues, 19 WuMLAMEr L. REv. 313 (1983)
(speech delivered by Justice Thurgood Marshall to the Second Circuit Judicial Conference
on September 9, 1982). See also Rosenberg, Note from the Underground: A Substantive
Analysis of Summary Adjudication by the Burger Court: Part 11, 19 Hous. L. REV. 831, 833-
69 (1982) (survey of summary disposals of cases presenting novel or controversial issues
including civil commitment of the mentally ill and the rights of parents). Of course, the
Court often avoids deciding cases by simply denying ceriorari. A denial of certiorari, how-
ever, has no precedential effect whereas a summary affirmance or dismissal for want of a
substantial federal question is a binding decision on the merits. MooPE's, supra note 25, at
4-18. See also Rosenberg, Part I, supra note 26, at 639 (comparing summary actions to
doctrines such as standing, justiciability and non-intervention which the Court also uses to
avoid deciding cases).
48. Note, Precedential Effect, supra note 27, at 141.
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rulings are binding precedent. Rather than analyzing the impor-
tant constitutional rights at stake, lower courts must spend their
time deciphering a jurisdictional statement and trying to guess the
meaning behind the Supreme Court's one line "opinion. '49 In addi-
tion, a summary disposal of a case presenting several issues com-
pounds the difficulty of this task because the lower court must de-
termine if the Supreme Court necessarily decided all of the issues
presented. Arguably, a summary decision should have little prece-
dential value if alternative theories will support the holding.'0 In
such a case, the Court did not necessarily decide any particular one
of the alternative theories. 1 Thus, the Court's misuse of a device
designed to quickly dispose of straightforward appeals has also
served to increase the burden on state and federal courts.2
49. Rosenberg, Part I, supra note 26, at 632-33 (summary actions may increase the
lower courts' dockets because parties will relitigate issues hoping that the Supreme Court
will grant plenary review). It is interesting to note that even though summary affirmances
and dismissals are decisions on the merits, such orders cannot be Shepardized indepen-
dently of their lower court opinions nor are they accessible through the Dicennial Digests.
Thus, a court may never be aware that the Supreme Court summarily disposed of a similar
case in a different jurisdiction. Note, Summary Disposition, supra note 25, at 421.
In addition, since 1971, the Office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court has included dis-
missals of appeals for want of a substantial federal question with denials of certiorari for the
purpose of statistical reporting even though dismissals of appeals are decisions on the mer-
its. The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REV. 303 n.c (1970) (including dismissals
with decisions on the merits is appropriate because dismissals are of "limited precedential
value").
50. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 433 n.18.
51. Note, Summary Disposition, supra note 25, at 407, 413 (a summary appeal is value-
less as precedent if the rule of the case is indeterminable); Note, Precedential Effect, supra
note 27, at 141 (Hicks rule is most effective where only one issue is raised).
52. See Note, Precedential Effect, supra note 27, at 133 (quoting Clark, J., in Hogge v.
Johnson, 526 F.2d 833, 836 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 913 (1976)) ("[a]n unques-
tioning application of the Hicks rule can lead to nothing but mischief and place an unneces-
sary restraining hand on the progress of federal constitutional adjudication") (brackets in
original).
The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals also use summary disposals to manage
their dockets. For example, Eleventh Circuit Court Rule 25 provides:
When the court determines that any of the following circumstances exist:
(a) judgment of the district court is based on findings of fact that are not clearly
erroneous;
(b) the evidence in support of a jury verdict is not insufficient;
(c) the order of an administrative agency is supported by substantial evidence on
the record as a whole;
(d) summary judgment, directed verdict or judgment on the pleadings is sup-
ported by the record;
and the court also determines that no error of law appears and an opinion would
have no precedential value, the judgment or order may be affirmed or enforced
without opinion.
11T CIR. R. 25.
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III. ANALYSIS OF Hardwick v. Bowers
A. Applicability of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney
In Hardwick, the Eleventh Circuit appropriately applied the
two-step test of Mandel in determining whether the Supreme
Court's summary affirmance in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney
was controlling. 3 First, the court determined that the issues
presented by Hardwick were the same as those presented in Doe.
4
Hardwick alleged that the Georgia statute violated his constitu-
tional right to privacy, due process, and freedom of expression and
association. 5 The jurisdictional statement in Doe presented the
same right to privacy and due process challenges, as well as an
equal protection argument under the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and
fourteenth amendments. 6 If the Supreme Court actually reached
the constitutional issues in Doe, it must have found that the Vir-
ginia statute did not violate any of the constitutional challenges
presented because the Court affirmed the district court's decision
which had declared the statute constitutional. The summary af-
firmance, however, would have no precedential effect on the issue
of freedom of association because this issue was not raised in Doe.
This court rule recognizes that a summary affirmance is a decision on the merits. But,
since the case presents no novel issues of law, an opinion would provide little aid to lower
courts. Because the decision follows easily from prior written opinions, district courts need
not be concerned with interpreting the particular case that the court of appeals summarily
affirmed. See also 5TH CIR. R. 47.6; National Labor Relations Bd. v. Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of Am., 430 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1970) (Chief Judge Brown emphasized that the
Fifth Circuit would use summary dispositions sparingly and only when an opinion would
have no precedential value.).
53. See supra text accompanying note 40.
54. The Georgia statute at issue in Hardwick and the Virginia statute upheld in Doe
are almost identical. The Georgia sodomy statute provided:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to
any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of
another .... (b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished
by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years.
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1981).
The Virginia sodomy statute provided:
If any person shall carnally know in any manner any.., male or female person
by the anus or by or with the mouth, or voluntarily submit to such carnal knowl-
edge, he or she shall be guilty of a felony and shall be confined in the peniten-
tiary not less than one year nor more than three years.
VA. CODE § 18.1-212 (1950) (repealed 1975, current version at VA. CODE § 18.2-10, 361
(1950)).
55. Hardwick v. Bowers, No. C83-273A, slip op. (N.D. Ga. Apr. 18, 1983) (included in
Petition for Certiorari at Appendix A).
56. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 44 U.S.L.W. 3448 (U.S. Feb. 10, 1976) (No. 75-
896).
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Despite this, the Eleventh Circuit merely devoted a short footnote
to freedom of association57 choosing instead to rest its decision on
the right to privacy.5 8
Second, the Eleventh Circuit found that the Supreme Court
did not necessarily decide the constitutional questions because the
plaintiffs in Doe may have lacked standing to sue. 59 Plaintiffs in
Doe were male homosexuals who regularly practiced sodomy in pri-
vate with other consenting adult males. They alleged that the sod-
omy statute had a chilling effect on their relationships with other
homosexuals. 0 One of the plaintiffs testified in a deposition intro-
duced at trial that police had harassed him on two occasions for
frequenting an area which homosexuals used as a meeting place.
He had never been arrested, however, nor even threatened with
arrest. 1 Their situation was very similar to that in Poe v. Ull-
man,62 where a doctor and three of his married patients challenged
a state statute that criminalized the use of contraceptives.6 8 Plain-
tiffs had never been arrested for violating the statute nor did they
face an immediate threat of arrest." In addition, the Court com-
mented that the "prosecution of spouses for use of contraceptives
[was] inherently bizarre."65 The Court admitted that the case did
fall within its Article III jurisdiction, but declined to address the
constitutional issues presented because the plaintiffs did not face
an immediate and real threat of prosecution for violating the
statute.66
57. 760 F.2d at 1208 n.6. Hardwick's brief also did not address freedom of association.
Brief of Appellants on Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Georgia at 1, Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 765 F.2d
1123 (11th. Cir. 1985). Because both the court and the parties emphasized the right to pri-
vacy, this note will be limited to Doe's effect on that issue.
58. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212.
59. For a similar analysis, see Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g en
banc denied, 746 F.2d 1579, 1580 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robinson, C.J. & Wald, Mikva & Ed-
ward, JJ., dissenting); Miller v. Rumsfield, 647 F.2d 80, 84 (9th Cir. 1981) (Norris, J., dis-
senting from denial of rehearing en banc); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 493, 415 N.E.2d
936, 943, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 953 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); L. TRiBE, AMERI-
CAN CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW 943 (1978).
60. Jurisdictional Statement at 4, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199
(E.D. Va. 1975), summ. af'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
61. Id.
62. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
63. Id. at 499-500.
64. Id. at 501.
65. Id. at 502 n.3.
66. Id. at 502, 508-09. Cf. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (past arrest
will not confer Article III standing to challenge constitutionality of police procedures where
repetition of arrest is purely speculative). See generally Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-
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Similarly the plaintiffs in Doe may have presented a case or
controversy within the meaning of Article III because they had a
personal stake in the outcome of the case. 7 They did not, however,
present any evidence to prove that the alleged threat of prosecu-
tion was real." Furthermore, prosecution of the plaintiffs would
seem just as improbable as prosecution of spouses in Poe because
plaintiffs' acts of sodomy allegedly took place in private with con-
senting adults. Thus, plaintiffs may have lacked standing to sue
because they had not been injured by a real and immediate threat
of prosecution. The Supreme Court could have premised the sum-
mary affirmance of Doe on standing, and therefore did not neces-
sarily consider the privacy issue as determinative in the case. Doe,
consequently, would not be controlling in Hardwick because the
basis of the summary affirmance was inherently unclear."9
There are three problems, however, with concluding that the
Supreme Court may have based its summary affirmance of Doe on
plaintiffs' lack of standing. First, the parties did not raise the issue
of standing in the jurisdictional statement or motion to dismiss.
70
Several statements by the Court, however, suggest that lower
courts are not bound by the jurisdictional statement if the sum-
mary affirmance can be interpreted on a narrower ground. For in-
stance, the Court stated that summary affirmances are binding
precedent on the issues presented and necessarily decided.7 1 In ad-
99 (1975) (presenting a comparative analysis of constitutional versus prudential standing).
Often it is difficult to differentiate between constitutional and prudential rules of stand-
ing. E. BARRrT & W. COHEN, CONSTIUTIONAL LAW 117 (6th ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
BAlmrR= & COHEN]. In Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, the Court described prudential
standing as a "corollary offshoot of the case and controversy rule." 331 U.S. 549, 570 (1946).
[C]onstitutional issues affecting legislation will not be determined in friendly,
nonadversary proceedings; in advance of the necessity of deciding them; in
broader terms than are required by the precise facts to which the ruling is to be
applied; if the record presents some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of; at the instance of one who fails to show that he is injured by the
statute's operation, or who has availed himself of its benefits; or if a construction
of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.
Id. at 569 (quoting Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
67. Warth, 422 U.S. at 498.
68. Jurisdictional Statement at 4, Doe. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUnONAL
LAW 943 (1978) (arguably, Doe was not ripe for adjudication).
69. Note, Summary Disposition, supra note 25, at 407, 413.
70. Jurisdictional Statement at 3; Motion to Dismiss at 1, Doe.
71. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 499 (1981); Illinois Elections
Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 182 (1979); Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173,
176 (1977). See also supra text accompanying note 43 (Justice Brennan instructed lower
court judges to determine whether a summary affirmance was actually based on the issues
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dition, the Court in Mandel stated that summary actions should be
interpreted in light of all the facts in the case. 72 It seems appropri-
ate, therefore, to consider the fact that the plaintiffs in Doe had
never been arrested, nor were they prosecuted. Finally, the entire
case comes to the Court on a direct appeal from a district court.
The Supreme Court is free to consider all issues raised below, not
solely those contained in the jurisdictional statement.73
The second problem with the court's characterization of Doe is
that neither the parties nor the district court raised the issue of
standing below. Of course, if the plaintiffs lacked constitutional
standing, the Court could raise the issue sua sponte because Article
III's requirement of a case or controversy goes to subject matter
jurisdiction, a challenge which can be raised at any time.7 ' The
Court will also occasionally address other issues related to jurisdic-
tion even if not raised by the parties in the lower court.7 5 The
Court has stated that the issues of constitutional and prudential
standing are closely intertwined.7 6 The former is an external limit
on the Court's power to decide a case, whereas the latter is an in-
ternal limit.77 It seems appropriate, therefore, for the Court to
raise either constitutional or prudential standing sua sponte be-
cause both issues go to the power of the Court to act.7 18 Thus, the
Court may have addressed the issue of standing in Doe even
though the parties did not raise it.
presented.).
72. See supra text accompanying note 39.
73. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 758 (4th ed. 1983). For an example of a
case in which the Court even considered questions not included in the petition for certiorari,
see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1980).
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). See, e.g., Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 398 (1979).
75. For example, the Court dismissed an appeal in Poe v. Ullman because the plaintiffs
lacked prudential standing. 367 U.S. 497, 501 (1961). The Court stated that it was not
bound by allegations of the complaint nor the stipulations between the parties. Id. In St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, the Court addressed the issue of mootness although
the parties themselves had not raised the issue. 438 U.S. 531, 537 (1978).
76. Rescue Army, 331 U.S. at 570-71. (The Court viewed the concept of justiciability as
founded in the role of judicial review within the federal system.).
77. BARRETT & COHEN, supra note 66, at 117. Some rules of standing stem from the
Constitution whereas others are judicially developed restraints. Id.
78. Cf. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 257 n.5 (1980) (intent issue not raised in the
court of appeals nor in the jurisdictional statement); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-
78 (1974) (eleventh amendment defense may first be raised on appeal because it so closely
relates to jurisdiction); Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478, 479 n.3 (1974) (The Court
recognized "plain error" not raised in jurisdictional statement and independently reviewed
the trial record.). If the Court will consider substantive issues sua sponte, it seems it would
be even more likely to consider issues of justiciability on its own as well.
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The third problem in regarding the Supreme Court's summary
affirmance of the district court's decision in Doe as based on stand-
ing is that the Court affirmed the judgment rather than remanding
for dismissal. Dismissal seems appropriate where the plaintiffs
lacked standing because the Court would be without jurisdiction
over the case.7' The Court, however, has not always adhered to
that practice. The Eleventh Circuit cited Shea v. Littleton"o and
Rizzo v.Goode8 l as examples of cases where the Court reversed the
lower court's decision, rather than remanding for dismissal, be-
cause the plaintiffs failed to allege a case or controversy pursuant
to Article 111. 82 The real question, however, as Judge Kravitch
noted in dissent,8 is whether the Court may affirm a lower court's
decision on the merits if it determines that the plaintiffs lacked
standing.
In Pressler v. Simon,s4 the District Court for the District of
Columbia held that Rep. Pressler had standing to challenge the
constitutionality of two statutes regulating congressional salaries,
but still found the statutes to be constitutional."6 Rep. Pressler ap-
pealed and the Supreme Court summarily affirmed.86 Justice
Rehnquist filed a concurring opinion stating: "Our 'unexplicated
affirmance' without opinion could rest as readily on our conclusion
that appellant lacked standing to litigate the merits of the ques-
tion as it could on agreement with the District Court's resolution
of the merits of the question. '87 Similarly, in Doe, the district
court presumably found that the plaintiffs had standing and then
79. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1214 (Kravitch, J., dissenting). See also FED. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(3).
80. 414 U.S. 488 (1974). Despite the Court's lack of jurisdiction, it alternatively de-
clared that plaintiffs did not state an adequate basis for equitable relief. Id. at 499.
81. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
82. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1207 n.5.
83. Id. at 1214 n.4.
84. 428 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1976).
85. Id. at 306.
86. 434 U.S. 1028 (1978).
87. Id. U.S. at 1029. No other justices filed opinions. See Rosenberg, Part I, supra note
26, at 635 & n.118 (Justices may have based their decision on plaintiff's lack of standing, or
they may have disagreed as to the rationale for affirmance.). See also Ashwander v. Tennes-
see Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 342 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (because the plaintiffs
lacked standing the Court should affirm the lower court's decision "without passing upon
it"); Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 711 n.4 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright & Tamm, JJ., concur-
ring) (majority reversed the lower court on the merits; Judges Tamm and Wright concurred
in the result because they believed plaintiff lacked prudential standing to sue), vacated &
remanded for dismissal, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (plurality held that the case presented a politi-
cal question).
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went on to declare the statute constitutional.8 The only distinc-
tion between the two cases is that in Pressler, the appellees twice
raised the issue of standing; once in the lower court and again in
the motions to dismiss.89 In Doe, the issue was never raised. Still, it
should be remembered that the Supreme Court may raise the issue
of justiciability sua sponte.90 The Eleventh Circuit's conclusion
that the Court may have summarily affirmed the district court's
decision in Doe without reaching the right to privacy issue is plau-
sible. Doe, therefore, would not be binding on the court in Hard-
wick because the Supreme Court did not "necessarily" decide the
right to privacy issue.
B. Doctrinal Developments Since Doe
After concluding that the Supreme Court may have predicated
its affirmance of Doe on standing, the Eleventh Circuit proposed
that even if that conclusion were wrong, doctrinal developments
since Doe have robbed it of any precedential value." Lower courts
need not blindly follow a prior decision of the Supreme Court until
such time as the Court expressly overrules that decision.2 Subse-
quent decisions may so erode an earlier opinion as to impliedly
overrule it and thereby relieve lower courts from following the
original decision.93 Such erosion is even more likely with summary
affirmances because they carry less precedential weight than full
opinions for the purpose of stare decisis. The Court, therefore,
might be more likely to reconsider an issue resolved summarily
than one resolved by a full opinion.9 4 The Eleventh Circuit cited
the following two cases as undercutting the decision in Doe, and
88. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1203.
89. Pressler, 428 F. Supp. at 304; Motion of the Secretary of the Treasury to Affirm at
9-10; Motion of Appellee J.S. Kimmitt, Secretary of the United States Senate to Dismiss, or
in the Alternative, to Affirm at 11-15; Motion of Appellee Kenneth R. Harding to Dismiss or
Affirm at 4-5, Pressler.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
91. "[I]f the Court has branded a question as insubstantial it remains so except when
doctrinal developments indicate otherwise." Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975)
(quoting Port Auth. Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Port of New York Auth., 387 F.2d
259, 263 n.3 (2d Cir. 1967)).
92. See, e.g., Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 716 & n.14, 717 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd per
curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (a three judge district court held that Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896) was not good law even though the Supreme Court had not expressly over-
ruled it).
93. Id.
94. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 500 (1981); Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974). See also supra note 39.
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leaving the right to privacy issue open as it applies to homosexuals.
A year after Doe, in Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional,9 the Court held, inter alia, that a state could not prohibit
the sale of nonprescription contraceptives to adults except by li-
censed pharmacists, nor could the state blanketly prohibit the sale
of nonprescription contraceptives to minors."e Justice Powell con-
curred in the result stating that the majority unnecessarily "would
subject all state regulation affecting adult sexual relations to the
strictest standard of judicial review."' 9 In response, Justice Bren-
nan, writing for the majority, noted that the holding was limited to
the individual's right to decide whether to prevent conception or
terminate a pregnancy and went on to state: "As we observe below,
'the Court has not definitively answered the difficult question
whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state stat-
utes regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior among adults,'
* . .and we do not purport to answer that question now."'98 In a
later section, joined by a plurality, Justice Brennan stressed that
the Court, in order to decide the case at bar, need not address the
appellees' argument that any state regulation of private consensual
sexual behavior was unconstitutional, and reiterated that the
Court had not definitively answered that question."
The Court's comment suggested that the constitutionality of
state sodomy statutes was still an open question, particularly in
light of the majority's failure to cite Doe.100 Justice Rehnquist un-
derscored this point in his dissent where he criticized the major-
ity's comment that "the Court has not definitively answered the
difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution pro-
95. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
96. Id. at 689-91, 694-96.
97. Id. at 703. Justice Powell would apply the rationally related test rather than the
compelling state interest test. Id. at 703-07.
98. Id. at 688 n.5 (brackets in original) (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 694 n.17. This view is consistent with the Court's traditional stance of not
deciding constitutional issues until absolutely necessary. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 503
(1961). See supra note 66. The plurality also cited, without further comment, a law review
article written before the decision in Doe that analyzed statutes criminalizing consensual
sexual behavior in light of the right to privacy doctrine. Note, On Privacy: Constitutional
Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 670, 719-38 (1973).
100. Perhaps the majority was signalling that its summary affirmance did not com-
pletely answer the questions raised in Doe. Three of the Justices comprising the Carey ma-
jority, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, had also dissented from the summary af-
firmance in Doe. Doe, 425 U.S. at 901. Justice Marshall had been particularly upset with
the Court's failure to address openly the right to privacy issue, especially because Justices
Blackmun, Stewart, and Powell had previously voted to extend the concept to abortion. B.
WOODWARD & S. ARmSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 505 (1979).
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hibits statutes regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior
among adults ..... He cited Doe as an example of a case in which
the Court had definitively acted in the area of sexual privacy. 1 1 No
other Justice, however, joined in his opinion although both Justices
White and Powell expressed concern that the Court's decision
would invalidate all state regulation of adult sexual behavior.102
The Carey decision generated three concurring opinions and
one dissent in addition to the majority opinion. As noted above,
the Justices themselves disagreed as to exactly what the decision in
Carey meant, let alone prior decisions addressing the right to pri-
vacy. 03 If the Court actually rested its affirmance in Doe on the
right to privacy issue, it does not seem likely that it would have
reconsidered that issue only fourteen months later. Carey, how-
ever, strengthens the argument that at least some of the Justices
may have based their affirmance on Doe's lack of standing rather
than on the right to privacy issue. Possibly the six Justices in the
majority voted to affirm Doe for different reasons.0 If nothing
else, Carey illustrated the confused status of the right to privacy
issue at the time of Doe. This confusion only compounded the dif-
ficulty lower courts naturally faced in interpreting the summary
affirmance of Doe.0 5
101. Carey, 431 U.S. at 718 n.2 (brackets in original). See also Linzer, The Meaning of
Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1297 (1979).
102. Carey, 431 U.S. at 702-03.
103. A detailed diagram is necessary to determine what the Court held in Carey. Jus-
tice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court in five parts.
Part Topic Addressed Justices Joining
I. Standing Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens,
White, Powell, Stewart
II. Defined right to privacy Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens,
Stewart
III. Prohibition of distribution of Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens,
nonmedical contraceptives except White, Stewart
through licensed pharmacists (See
supra text accompanying note 98)
IV. Prohibition of distribution of Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stewart
nonmedical contraceptives to minors
(See supra text accompanying note 99)
V. Prohibition of advertising or display of Brerinan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens,
contraceptives White, Stewart
Note that Justices Stevens and White declined to join Part IV because they believed Bren-
nan's opinion swept too broadly in condemning state regulation of minors' sexual activity.
104. Note, Summary Disposition, supra note 25, at 408.
105. For further discussion of Carey, see Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1138 (N.D.
Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 493-94, 415
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The Eleventh Circuit cited New York v. Uplinger'0 e as a sec-
ond case that undercut the Doe decision. In Uplinger, the New
York Court of Appeals held a state statute that prohibited loiter-
ing for the purpose of procurring another person to engage in devi-
ate sexual behavior unconstitutional. The court based its holding
on an earlier decision in People v. Onofre10 7 which declared a stat-
ute criminalizing consensual sodomy unconstitutional. 08 The state
appealed in Uplinger and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 0 9
After full briefing and oral argument, the Court dismissed the writ
as improvidently granted because (1) the opinion of the New York
Court of Appeals did not clearly state the constitutional issue de-
cided, 10 (2) the positions of state officials conflicted,' and (3) a
thorough evaluation of Uplinger would require consideration of
the issues raised in the prior opionion because the lower court
based its opinion on Onofre."2 Furthermore, the state had not
challenged the decision in Onofre. The Court considered the case
to be "an inappropriate vehicle for resolving the important consti-
tutional issues raised by the parties.""
'
Uplinger does not provide very strong support for the Elev-
enth Circuit's position because a dismissal of certiorari has no
precedential value. "4 In addition, the Court admitted its uncer-
tainty as to which constitutional issues the lower court actually de-
cided." 5 The Court's per curiam opinion, however, bolsters the
comment in Carey that the Court had not fully addressed the con-
stitutionality of statutes regulating adult consensual sexual
behavior.
N.E.2d 936, 943, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 954 (1980); Linzer, supra note 101, at 1297.
106. 58 N.Y.2d 936, 447 N.E.2d 62, 460 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1980), cert. dismissed as improv-
idently granted, 104 S. Ct. 2332 (1984).
107. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981) (affirmed lower court's dismissal of defendent's indictment).
108. Id. at 494, 415 N.E.2d at 943, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
109. New York v. Uplinger, 464 U.S. 812 (1983).
110. The court of appeals may have rested its decision on the fact that the loitering
statute was not severable from the sodomy statute. 104 S. Ct. at 2333 n.2.
111. 104 S. Ct. at 2333 n.1. (The District Attorney for Erie County represented the
state, but the Attorney General filed a brief as arnicus curiae in support of plaintiffs.).
112. Id. at 2334.
113. Id.
114. Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 365 n.1 (1973) (a
prior dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted does not establish the law of the case);
Blumstein, The Supreme Court's Jurisdiction-Reform Proposals, Discretionary Review &
Writ Dismissals, 26 VAND. L. REv. 895, 921 (1973).
115. Uplinger, 104 S. Ct. at 2333.
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IV. COMMENTS
A. Further Uncertainty Regarding Doe
The significance of Carey and Uplinger is not in showing that
the Court has moved away from its decision in Doe, as the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit contended, but rather in demon-
strating that the Court in Doe may not have originally intended to
answer the question of whether the constitutional right to privacy
extended to private consensual sexual behavior. In other words,
the Court's comments in Carey and Uplinger support the premise
that at least some Justices may have based the summary affirm-
ance of Doe on the plaintiffs' lack of standing.
It is interesting to note that the Court decided Doe at a time
when it was also narrowing the reach and scope of the doctrine of
standing. For example, the Court handed down a 5-4 decision in
Warth v. Seldin,"6 a seminal case restricting the scope of standing,
just nine months before Doe. The previous year, the Court denied
standing to certain plaintiffs suing both as citizens and taxpay-
ers.117 The fact that the same Justices who voted to deny standing
in these two cases also voted to summarily affirm Doe supports the
contention that some of the Justices may have based their decision
in Doe on the plaintiffs' lack of standing.118 At the least, it in-
creases the uncertainty as to what Doe necessarily decided.
Not only was the Court divided on the issue of standing, but
the concept of a constitutional right to privacy was in an even
greater state of flux.1" ' After the Court decided Eisenstadt v.
Baird 02 and Roe v. Wade,1 2' scholars speculated as to the full
reach of the constitutional right to privacy. 22 Eisenstadt declared
that a state may not prevent the distribution of contraceptives to
116. 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (The five justices in the majority also voted to summarily
affirm Doe.).
117. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (The six
justices in the majority also voted to summarily affirm Doe.).
118. The Court handed down several other important opinions addressing standing be-
tween 1974 and 1976. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166 (1974); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
119. Rosenberg, Notes from the Underground: A Substantive Analysis of Summary
Adjudication by the Burger Court: Part H, 19 Hous. L. REv. 831, 848-56 (1982) (analysis of
the right to privacy cases prior to Doe) [hereinafter cited as Rosenberg, Part II]. But see
Hafen, supra note 21, at 517-21; Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal
Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 670 (1973) (the Court has consistently refused to extend the right
to privacy to encompass lifestyle arguments).
120. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See supra note 1.
121. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See supra note 1.
122. See supra note 6.
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unmarried persons. 123 Roe declared that criminal abortion statutes
violated the constitutional right to privacy whether applied to mar-
ried or unmarried women. 12 4 After these decisions, it seemed that
the right to privacy might extend to all forms of adult consensual
sexual behavior because Eisenstadt and Roe had expanded the
concept beyond the marital relationship.
1 2 5
The Court further confused matters when, only three months
after Doe, it decided Planned Parenthood v. Danforth.126 In Dan-
forth, the Court held that the state may not require minors seeking
abortions to have parental consent 127 nor require married women
seeking abortions to obtain their husbands' consent.128 Four Jus-
tices dissented from the first holding 29 while three Justices dis-
sented from the latter holding. 30 Apparently the Justices dis-
agreed as to whether the right to privacy should be strictly limited
to "traditional family" concepts or expanded to embrace other
forms of adult behavior.13' Even after Danforth it was not clear
how far the right to privacy could extend. Indeed, permitting mi-
nors to obtain abortions without parental consent does not fit
within any definition of "traditional family" concepts. 32
It is uncertain whether the Court based its summary affirm-
ance of Doe on the issue of standing or on the right to privacy.
Perhaps all six Justices voted to affirm for different reasons. "3
When the meaning of a summary affirmance is so vague, lower
courts would be better advised to disregard the case as precedent,
rather than to erroneously and prematurely foreclose an important
constitutional debate. "
123. 405 U.S. at 438.
124. 410 U.S. at 113.
125. See supra note 119.
126. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
127. Id. at 72-75.
128. Id. at 67-72.
129. Id. at 54.
130. Id.
131. Compare id. at 71 & 75 (majority rejected the state's interest in promoting mar-
riage and family as a justification for the statute) with id. at 93 (White, J., dissenting) (hus-
bands have an interest in child bearing) & 95 (parental consultation is traditional method of
protecting children).
132. The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REV. 70, 134-37 (1977) (criticism of
the Court's use of tradition to define constitutional rights).
133. See Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo, 428 U.S. 913, 920 (1976) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
134. Rosenberg, Part II, supra note 119, at 631 (discussion of the high risk of erroneous
decisions by the Court in summary actions).
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B. The Supreme Court's Resolution?
The State of Georgia has filed a petition for writ of certiorari
in Hardwick v. Bowers,'" which the Supreme Court of the United
States has granted. 186 In the past, lower courts have cited Doe as
precedent when dismissing cases raising the question of whether
the Constitution protects the right of consenting adults to engage
in "unorthodox" private sexual behavior. 13 7 The Supreme Court,
however, should not rely on Doe because the Court does not con-
sider summary affirmances binding on itself.1 8
When the Court does hear Hardwick, the time will finally ar-
rive for a possible resolution of the issue of a homosexual's right to
privacy."3 9 Indeed, this question has been hopelessly muddled be-
cause of the Court's summary affirmance in Doe. The Court, there-
fore, should take this opportunity to further clarify the preceden-
tial value of summary disposals. The Justices should consider
patterning a rule governing their summary calendar after the rules
promulgated by the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits. 140 The Court would still be able to manage its appellate
docket if it limited summary disposals to frivolous appeals and
cases controlled by binding precedent because such cases compose
the majority of appeals. 1 4  These summary disposals, however,
would have little or no precedential value.'4 2 In fact, the Court
should specifically declare that lower courts are not to treat sum-
mary actions as precedent. Thus, the Court, as required by stat-
ute, 43 would decide appeals which it summarily disposed of on the
merits, but the decisions would not add to the body of precedent.
If the Court should summarily dispose of a case that presents an
important constitutional issue after declaring that such a disposal
will have no precedential value, at least the mischief will be con-
fined to that particular case. If the Court removes the unnecessary
stamp of precedent from its summary disposals, lower courts will
135. Hardwick v. Bowers, 54 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 25, 1985) (No. 85-140).
136. N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1985, at 11, col. 1-3 (nat'l ed.).
137. See supra note 7.
138. See supra note 39 and text accompanying note 94.
139. See supra note 21.
140. See supra note 52 for text of Eleventh Circuit Court Rule 25.
141. See supra note 46.
142. See Rosenberg, Part II, supra note 119, at 896 (Summary dispositions should be
given persuasive rather than binding authority.).
143. See supra text accompanying note 25.
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then be freed from the task of wrestling the Court's hidden mean-
ing from within the words "affirmed on appeal."
ELISA L. FULLER*
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